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THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM: FIRST
AMENDMENT CASES IN THE 1998-99 TERM
Joel M. Gora*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Thank you, Dean Kaufman. Our final subject is the First
Amendment.' Our final speaker, who is a consistent participant in
these conferences, is a professor at Brooklyn Law School with a
profound background in the area of First Amendment liberties.
Professor Gora:
Thank you very much, Judge Lazer. Dean Kaufman is a very
hard act to follow and that is a very tough introduction to live up
to, but mercifully, I only have two cases to discuss so it will be
relatively brief.
In 1998, the Supreme Court had the fewest number of First
Amendment cases, as there were only two.' Then again in 1999
there were only two First Amendment cases? The eases in 1998
addressed some very controversial public issues. One case dealt
with funding of the arts,' which of course is now a front-page
issue.' The other case confronted the issue of whether minor
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Former Associate Legal Director,
American Civil Liberties Union. General Counsel, New York Civil Liberties
Union.
1U.S. CONST. amend I. This amendment provides in pertinent part that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." Id.
2 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding
that the statute requiring the NEA to ensure excellence and artistic merit by
which grant applications are judged is not in violation of the First Amendment
and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague); Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding an exercise of
journalistic discretion in managing a non-public forum valid).
3 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc., 525 U.S. 182
(1999); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States, 527
U.S. 173 (1999).
4Finley, 524 U.S. at 572.
5 See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York & Rudolph W.
Guiliani, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also D.J. Gershon,
Constitutional Law: Mayor's Decision to Stop Funding the Brooklyn Museum
Is Held Unconstitutional, 222 N.Y.L.J. 88 (1999); Jack Achiezer Goggenheim,
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political party candidates had to be included in televised debates.6
Of course, the spectre of Minnesota Governor, Jesse Ventura's,
illuminating our political scene has caused a lot of concern. On the
other hand, the two cases from 1999 were much calmer in terms of
their political impact and this gives me the sense that the 1999 term
is really a bit of a consblidating moment. If there were a prevailing
theme I would describe it as the "calm before the storm" because
this past term was rather modest with no new, major developments.
The.2000. term, however, will be-quite .the opposite.
I. A BUCKLEY CASE
In 1962, the Court first placed its foot into what Justice
Frankfurter called the "political thicket" of getting involved in
applying the Constitution to the law of democracy.7 Since then, the
Court has been actively involved with the constitutional aspects of
the electoral system. The first of the cases I want to talk about is
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation.8 This is not
the Buckley case,9 this is a Buckley case; but it deals with electoral
and election law issues.
The Buckley case dealt with petitions to put initiatives or
referenda on ballots for statewide voting.' Specifically, the case
involved a number of restrictions that Colorado created for the
placement of initiatives on the ballot." Notably, this case was not
The Supreme Chutzpah, 222 N.Y.L.J. 91 (1999); Anthony Tommasini, Amyas
Ames Is Dead at 93; A Champion ofLincoln Center, N.Y. Times Abstracts, Jan.
26, 2000; David Barstow, Guiliani Ordered to Restore Funds for Art Museum,
N.Y. Times Abstracts, Nov. 2, 1999; Ralph Blumenthal, City Administration
Official Opposes Guiliani on Museum, Oct. 9, 1999.6Arkansas Educational Television Commission, 523 U.S. at 669.
7 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that the reapportionment
disputes were justiciable).
8 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
9 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
'
0 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186.
1 Id. The question addressed by the Court focused on three requirements of
the Colorado initiative the requirements that "petition circulators be registered
voters... , wear identification badges bearing the circulator's name.... and that
proponents of an initiative report the names and addresses of all paid circulators
and the amount paid to each circulator." Id.
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the first instance where Colorado was before the Court on such a
matter. 2 Ten years earlier in Meyer v. Grant,3 Colorado had
prohibited the employment of people, for money, to gather
signatures on petitions for the placement of referenda on the
ballot. 4  The Supreme Court, unanimously, held that this
prohibition violated the First Amendment. 5 The Court noted that
placing limitations upon the funding of petition gatherers resulted
in limiting the gathering of petition signatures. 6 Therefore, such a
prohibition limits First Amendment activity.'
The Court in Buckley relied upon the reasoning advanced in
Meyer, emphasizing this basic principle.'8 While the Court stated
that the issue of gathering signatures to put referenda on a ballot is
at a divide between two kinds of electoral activities, ballot access
and campaigning, it noted that the issue was similar to leafleting. 9
The Court reasoned that this similarity was due to the fact that the
petition gatherer was tendering a petition to a person, providing an
explanation of the petition, asking for a signature and placing the
matter on the ballot.20 Moreover, the Court noted that leafleting is
one of the most pristine, pure and fully protected First Amendment
activities.2 On the other hand, the Court stated that to the extent
that the effect of gathering these signatures would be to put a
matter on the ballot, it involves more issues that the government
might need to regulate.' Hence, this area is really in conflict: the
leaflet, pure and simple on the one hand, and the regulation of
electoral, ballot, and governmental matters on the other hand.
The case also involved six requirements or limitations that
Colorado had place upon petition gathering. Initially, there was an
age requirement under which one could not be solicited by anyone
12 See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
13486 U.S. 414 (1988).
14 id
'5 Id at 422-423.
16Id at 423
17id
'
8 Bucldey, 525 U.S. at 186.
'
9Id. at 199.20 id
21 iat 
422 Id at 203-04-
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under eighteen years old.23 This solicitation was confined to a six-
month period so it could not continue indefinitely. 4 Also, there
had to be an affidavit with each batch of signatures that was
gathered.' In addition to the gatherer's identity and address, the
affidavit had to include the petition gatherer's signature stating
under oath their'familiaity with the ballot measure for which they
were gathering signatures.26 The lower courts upheld these three
requirements and the Supreme Court denied the portion of the
.petition for certiorari. that addressed. those issues."7  While the
Court did not say that those three requirements were valid, the
Court's refusal to review them was a pretty strong indication that
the three requirements would be sustained.2" Thus, an eighteen
year age requirement, a six-month limitation, and an affidavit
signed by the person seeking the signatures indicating that they are
familiar with the content was permissible.29
However, there were three petition requirements that were
sharply at issue. First, petition circulators must be registered
voters.3 Second, signature gatherers must wear an identification
badge that indicates if they are a volunteer or an employee.3
There must also be the periodic disclosure of the sponsors of the
ballot question. The Supreme Court reviewed each of these
issues.
In terms of the methodology employed by the Court, Justice
Ginsburg basically stated that the Court would utilize an ad hoc
approach.33 There was no litmus paper test, nor any other clear-cut
approach. Rather, the Court's approach resembled a balancing
2 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 188.
24 Id.
2 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 190.
28 id.
29 Id. at 188-89.
30 id.
3 1 id.
32 Id. at 188. The initiative required "on a monthly basis, the names of the
proponents, the name and address of each paid circulator, the name of the
proposed ballot measure, and the amount of money paid and owed to each
circulator during the month." Id.33 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192.
34 Id.
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methodology. 5 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the goal was to make
sure that the requirements did not unduly restrain the ability of
groups to circulate the petitions, obtain signatures and present them
to the voters. 6 Utilizing this as a benchmark, Justice Ginsberg
stated that each restriction must be examined on its own basis. 37
Interestingly, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion indicated that
there should be an application of strict scrutiny to all of these
restrictions because they limit the ability of people to put out their
message and to use the ballot to do so. 8 However, the Court
declined to take Justice Thomas's approach. The majority
indicated that while its approach was consistent with the strict
scrutiny that Justice Thomas had advocated, it was not a
synonymous approach.39  Consequently, each of the three
requirements was invalidated. °
Utilizing its own approach, the Court invalidated the requirement
that petition circulators be registered voters."' The Court
emphasized that such a requirement would prevent the
involvement of five hundred thousand to one million Colorado
residents.42 This would result in a diminution of speech associated
with seeking the necessary signatures on a petition to put a
question on the ballot.43 Moreover, the restriction would limit the
number of voices that could be heard." Finally, the restraint
limiting circulation to registered voters was well overbroad in
terms of the legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud and
duress."
35 id.
36 id.
37id.
38 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206. (Thomas, J., concurring). The standard of strict
scrutiny will be used to determine if a statute is constitutional if there is both a
compelling state interest and sufficiently narrowly tailored means. Id.39 1d at 192.
40Id at 187.
41 Id at 195-96 (noting that the ease of registration misses the point that some
petition circulators may choose not to register as a matter of political
expression).42 Id. at 193.
43 id.
4Id. at 197 (finding the residency requirement would unduly restrict the
number of message carriers in the "ballot-access arena").451 Id. at 194-95.
2000
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It is important to note that the Court failed to resolve the
following question discussed by the lower courts: persons must be
registered voters in order to solicit these signatures, and whether
these persons must be residents of the state.46 The Court also left
open whether a residency requirement would be vulnerable.
Betweefi the lines, however, there is an indication that the Court
would be favorably inclined toward a residency requirement, even
though it struck down a registered voter requirement.4"
'Pie second restriction the Court addressed was the requirement
that people gathering signatures for petitions wear badges
identifying themselves, stating their name, as well as indicating
whether they were paid or volunteer-petition-signature gatherers.4"
The Supreme Court likened this to the requirement that leafleters
wear identification badges.49 The Court essentially stated that an
identification requirement presented too much of a chill on the
ability of the people to gather signatures on petitions.5 0 As a result,
the name tag restriction was struck down."
This case was similar to McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commissions,52 where the Supreme Court upheld the right of
political anonymity and struck down the requirement that anyone
handing out a leaflet had to print their name on the leaflet. 3 In
striking such a requirement, the Court stressed its fear that placing
a nametag on one's message may lead to problems, especially if
the message is controversial.' For example, soliciting signatures
to put a legalizing marijuana ballot question or a restricting
abortion question may likely result in harassment against by those
wearing the name tag.5
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that it is necessary
to require periodic disclosure by the sponsors of a ballot question
46Id.
47 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 197.
48 id.
49 Id. at 199.
so Id.
s' Id. at 200.
52 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
53 Id. at 357.
54 id.
" Id at 342.
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who were paying people to go out and solicit signatures. 6 The
Court emphasized that the interest in preventing fraud could be
dealt with in less restrictive ways."
The Court was quite clear in its decision and the vote on striking
the registered voter requirement was unanimous. Moreover, the
vote on striking the nametag and the disclosure requirements was
six to three on each issue, with Justice Thomas joining the majority
result only.58 Justices O'Connor, Breyer and Rehnquist dissented
on some of the questions, taking the position that although they
went along with striking the registered voter requirement as a
direct interference with the ability to have people put out the
message, the disclosure requirement did serve the interest in
preventing fraud.59
I believe that this case breaks no new ground. The case does
articulate that certain clear ballot petitioning procedures are
impermissible: a nametag, a registered voter limitation, and a
required disclosure of solicitor names afterwards. However, the
case left unanswered those important questions of whether a
residency requirement would be permissible, in addition to
whether some form of identification stating whether one is a paid
solicitor is permissible.
HI. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v,. United
States
The next case that I would like to discuss is Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States, a commercial
speech case.6' The commercial speech doctrine was established in
Bigelow v. Virginia,6' where the Court, for the first time, struck
down a statute which restricted a newspaper advertisement for
services.62 The advertisement was for abortion services and it
56 BuCkey, 525 U.S. at 204.
57id.
58 Id
581d.
59 1d at 659.
60 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States, 119 S.Ct.
1923 (1999).
61421 U.S. 809 (1975).
62Id. at 830.
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appeared in a state where abortions were illegal.63 However,
abortion services were legal in the state where the abortions were
to be performed.' The Supreme Court held that the
communication of lawful truthful information could not be
automatically restrained on the ground that it was for a commercial
purpose for goods or services.65 Since Bigelow, the Court has
entertained approximately twenty to twenty-five cases in the
commercial speech area, invalidating most of the restraints.
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States
was no exception.' This case addressed the status of the federal
ban on broadcast advertising for lotteries or casino gambling.67
This is worth mentioning, because historically, there was a time
when there was a ban on broadcasting for lotteries, casinos and
other items.68 Additionally, there was a time when there was a
total, country-wide ban on such activity, except for Las Vegas,
Reno and one or two other places. Gambling was illegal, so
advertising for gambling was illegal. However, throughout the
past few years, gambling has become legal in many states.
Nevertheless, there remain a number of restraints on advertising of
gambling, particularly those utilizing broadcast media.69
As a result, the Court had to deal with a statute that banned
broadcast advertising of casino gambling or lotteries.7" In Greater
63 Id. at 811-12.
64Id. at 812.
65 Id. at 818.
6 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999).
"
7 1d. at 1926.
681d. (citing Act of Mar. 1895, 28 Stat. 963 (which prohibited the
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce and the mailing of, tickets and
advertisements for lotteries and similar enterprises); Act of Mar. 2,1827, § 6, 4
Stat. 238 (restricting the participation of postmasters and assistant postmasters in
the lottery business); Act of July 27, 1868, § 13, 15 Stat. 196 (prohibiting the
mailing of any letters or circulars concerning lotteries or similar enterprises);
Act of July 12, 1876, § 2, 19 Stat. 90 (repealing an 1872 limitation of the mails
prohibition to letters and circulars concerning illegal lotteries); Anti-Lottery Act
of 1890, § 1, 26 Stat. 465 (extending the mails prohibition to newspapers
containing advertisements or prize list for lotteries or gift enterprises).
69 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (setting forth the four-part test for measuring restrictions on
commercial speech).
70 Id. at 1927. The statute addressed by the Court can be found at 18 U.S.C. §
1304 (1934).
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New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, broadcasters were advertising in
the New Orleans Metropolitan area where these activities were
legal.' However, the broadcast extended into Texas and Arkansas,
where casino gambling and lotteries were illegal.' The United
States claimed that the advertisements could be prohibited because
of the illegality of gambling in Texas and Arkansas.' In this case,
there was also an effort by some of the trade and advertising
groups to get the Court to abandon the four-part test for measuring
restrictions on commercial speech and adopt a stricter approach.
This four-part test had previously been developed in a 1981
New York case called Central Hudson v. Public Service
Commission of N.Y.'7 At the outset, there must be a threshold
determination of "whether the expressions were protected by the
First Amendment."75  This determination requires four
considerations. To begin, "for commercial speech to come within
this provision it must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading."76 Second, one must ask "whether the asserted
governmental interests in restraining the speech are substantial."'
Third, "if both inquiries yield positive answers, one must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interests asserted," and finally whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to attain that interest."' This is the
careful tailoring requirement.
Utilizing this four-part test, the Court has struck down most of
the commercial advertising bans and restraints that have come
before it. Nevertheless, there is a movement to get the Court to
abandon that test and replace it with the rule that commercial
speech is free speech and cannot be restrained except for the issue
of falsity. Despite this movement, the Court has expressly declined
to do so.
The Central Hudson test was applied to invalidate the ban on
broadcasting of gambling information from states where gambling
71 1d. at 1928.
72id.
73id.
74 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
75 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass n., 119 S.Ct. at 1930.
76id.
77 id.
79 id.
2000 379
TOURO LAW REVIEW
was not illegal.79 The Court conceded that the governmental
interest in deterring gambling was substantial. However, the Court
said the government does not exactly pursue a coherent policy in
this area, to the extent that there is a great deal of gambling that is
allowed."0 However, the way in which the government could
pursue suc a purpose was essentially riddled with exceptions.
The Court listed a number of ways in which the government
permitted advertising of gambling.8' In-state lotteries could
advertise ii radio or television, which is why weknow the phrase,
"You've Got To Be In It To Win It." Furthermore, Indian tribes,
tribal casinos and tribal-owned casinos could lawfully advertise,
certain government-owned casinos could advertise and lotteries
run by charities could also advertise.82
This created a situation where everybody could advertise
gambling, except those who sponsor private casino gambling. As a
result, the Court stated that in that kind of "Swiss cheese"
regulatory world, in a world where, in the Court's phrase, "the law
is as "pierced with exceptions," the regulatory scheme failed the
final element of the four-part test: the interest may be substantial,
but the regulatory fit was almost irrational." 3
Based upon this reasoning, the Court concluded that a ban on
only certain kinds of gambling advertising, which was enforced in
only certain kinds of ways, failed the narrowly tailored
requirement and did not advance the government's objective."
The doctrine that the government has to regulate the First
Amendment area in a consistent and coherent fashion is not only
important for measuring government regulations of commercial
speech, but also has become important for measuring other kinds
of government regulations of-speech.
Moreover, when the government goes to court, be it the federal,
state or local government, seeking to prohibit a certain kind of
message and yet permits many other similar messages for media
791d.
'
0 Id. at 1931.81Id. at 1933.
82 id.
83 Id. at 1923.
Id. at 1933.
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communication to be aired, the government has a burden to justify
why it is only regulating the defendant.
This is not to be referred to as a sort of an "underbreadth"
doctrine, but rather as a theory of underinclusiveness. The issue is
if there are such harms in communicating information about
gambling, then why have so many forms of that communication
been permitted to occur? 5  Moreover, in the area of business
regulation, you remember the old saying "one step at a time," the
government is allowed to regulate "one step at a time." The Court
has increasingly stated that "one step at a time" does not get the
job done in the area of commercial speech.
Furthermore, if some speakers are regulated while others are not,
when the speech is essentially the same, then at the very least there
has been a violation of the principle that one must naturally be
pursuing the goals that one seeks to advance.
The aforementioned cases dealing with commercial speech and
with the regulation of political activity are the two major cases last
term that address the regulation of free speech activity.' The
outcome of these cases was not surprising.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ABSTINENCE
There are three cases in which the First Amendment prevails that
demand brief attention. There were no cases where the First
Amendment did not prevail, so the score is three to nothing.
Nevertheless, these are cases where I view the Court as having
basically abstained on the First Amendment issue. Let me just
briefly explain what this statement means by an analysis of the
three cases.
The first case, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee,"' began as a major First Amendment case. The case
represented an effort by the federal government to deport a number
of people from the Middle East who were here on visas and other
type of temporary statuses.8s  The government claimed the
85 New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1933.
86 See id; see also Central Hudson v. Public Service Communications, 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
87 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999).
8 Id. at 939-40.
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individuals were involved in advocating communism among other
kinds of acts. 9 Based upon this claim, the government argued that
the individuals could be deported.9' The case began when
Attorney General Edwin Meese was the Attorney General, and
reached th, Supreme Court for.a-full decision not on the merits in
1999."' However, the case was a major First Amendment case
with a detailed lower court opinion from the Ninth Circuit
decision.' Since it came from that liberal circuit, one ought not be
surprised A the opinion's vindicating First Amendment rights for
people to join all kinds of organizations, even ones allegedly
subversive and vindicating as well the First Amendment rights of
people who were only temporarily on our shores.
In any event, the case was going to be an important one for the
determination of one's right to join a controversial organization.
In addition, it was important for the full First Amendment
protection of aliens temporarily residing in America. While the
case was being litigated in the Ninth Circuit, Congress passed a
major revision of the immigration laws and procedures.9 The
effect of the revision was to deny anticipatory federal court review
of deportation matters, even though the effort to seek federal
review was based on a claim that the deportation itself was a
violation of the First Amendment.94
In a lengthy and convoluted opinion, Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, stated that it is not necessary to reach these First
Amendment issues, as Congress has precluded the Court from
doing so.95 Thus, a case that started out as a First Amendment case
became a federal courts case.
891Id
90 Id. at 939.
91 Id. at 936. Since the initiation of the deportation proceedings in 1987, the
case "made four trips through the District Court for the Central District of
California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." The
Ninth Circuit decided the case on the merits in 1995. Id
92 See Ampator v. Reno, 170 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 1999).
93 The revision passed by Congress was the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-546,which repealed a
former judicial-review scheme and created a more restrictive scheme, codified
in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994 ed., Supp. III). Id.
94 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 119 S. Ct. at 938-40.
95 d. at 936.
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Several concurring opinions stated that if the Court thought that
there was truly a First Amendment threat, then the Court might be
willing to carve out an exception to the rule precluding federal
review of these matters." However, the concurrence found no
evidence of a strong First Amendment threat, and consequently
supported the preclusion of judicial review.' As a result, I think
that this case represents an instance where the Court has abstained
on the First Amendment issue.
The second case to illustrate the Court's abstinence involved a
cause of action for severe peer sexual harassment.9" However, on
the other side of this issue, and one of the points that animated the
quite passionate dissenters, was the proper interpretation of Title
IX, and whether schools had notice of their potential liability
under these circumstances."° One minor, yet important, aspect of
the case was that sexual harassment often takes the form of verbal
interactions between teachers and students, or as in this instance,
by one student to another.'
There was a significant amount of concern expressed in the
dissenting opinion that the rule announced might have some
untoward free speech consequences." " These consequences could
possibly require, coerce, or pressure school boards to clamp down
on any kind of student-to-student speech that might be viewed as
sexist or racist, in order to avoid liability.10 3
96 d. at 947-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
97 Id. at 947.
93 Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S. CL 1661 (1999). In
Davis, a fifth-grade student's parent sued the school board and officials under
Title IX, alleging the failure to remedy the classmate's sexual harassment of the
student. The issue in the case was whether "a recipient of federal education
funding may be liable for damages under Title IX under any circumstances for
discrimination in the form of student-on-student sexual harassment." See id at
1661-71.
99 Id at 1677 (1999). One of the petitioner's claims was a claim asserted under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20
U.S.C. §1681 et. seq.
'0 Id. at 1678.
'
01 Id. at 1661.
'o 2d. at 1677.1031id
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There is a large difference between a dirty harsh word and an
epithetic exchange among two students in a schoolyard, and the
kind of overt and massive discrimination at the other end of the
spectrum. However, the dissent was worried that the school boards
would feel pressure to be as restrictive as possible of students'
speech in order to avoid liability."°  Moreover, the dissent was
concerned that the school boards would find themselves caught in
the middle between wanting to prevent the harassment from
.occurring and wanting..to, avoid violations of free speech or due
process rights of the students accused of such behavior or such
expression. 05
Again, the Davis case was one in which the Court abstained
from addressing the First Amendment. Thus, while the dissenters
were certainly concerned about the First Amendment as part of
their theme, the case essentially turned on federalism and
interpretations of Title IX. °
The third of the abstention cases, the so-called "ride-along
cases" derive from those instances where the police have invited
members of the media to ride along during the execution of a
search warrant. 7 For instance, in Wilson v. Layne, the Supreme
Court held when the police permit the "ride alongs," the persons
whose homes are invaded by the police and the press are entitled to
sue the police for violating their Fourth Amendment rights by
including the press and thereby going beyond the scope of the
search." 8
One of the arguments made to justify allowing the ride-alongs
was that the First Amendment both permitted and indeed required
full reporting about the criminal justice system.' The Court
agreed and cited cases where the press could not be punished for
'04 Id. at 1661.
105 id.
106 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended,
20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq.
107 See e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1999) (holding that bringing
reporters into a homeowner's home during an attempted execution of a search
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment is prohibition against unreasonable
searches).
'°SId at 1699.
'09Id. at 1698.
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reporting information about the criminal justice process. '
However, the Court stressed that it is not permissible to overcome
an individual's right in order to advance the First Amendment."'
Hence, even though there is generally a First Amendment interest
in reporting police behavior and activity, this interest cannot
supercede the very specific homeowner's interest in the non-
occurrence of having a search recorded for posterity."'
A final case where the Court abstained from confronting First
Amendment issues was the Chicago loitering case."' This case
addressed the issue of whether "Standing on a Comer Watching
All of the Girls Go By" was a protected right or just the name of a
song."4 This case was a possible First Amendment case because
the loitering ordinance was overbroad, as it could be used to keep
groups from congregating for political purposes."' Historically,
loitering statutes were frequently used by police to instruct
leafletters or protesters to move on.
A very strong First Amendment argument was advanced in the
case."" However, in the Court's opinion the contention really
received rather short thrift, perhaps accurately so. The Court stated
that it would be more concerned about the overbreadth of this anti-
loitering ordinance if the Court believed that it really interdicted
First Amendment activity--namely, leafleting, speech and
assembly for political purposes."7  However, there was no
evidence whatsoever in the record that the ordinance was used to
interdict First Amendment activity, therefore the Court refused to
apply First Amendment doctrine."'
Furthermore, the Court noted that to the extent there was any
First Amendment activity at all, such activity consisted merely of
11o Id
112 id.
113 City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
114 1d at 1857.
115 Id.
16 Id. at 1856. The argument that was made was that the "ordinance impaired
the freedom of assembly of non-gang members in violation of the First
Amendment to the Constitution and Article I of the Illinois Constitution and that
it was unconstitutionally vague." Id.
17 Id. at 1857.
"s Id
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the right to "hang out" and the right to assemble for nonpolitical
purposes."9 The Court went on to say that this case was a due
process vagueness case, and emphasized that due process was
violated by the lack of notice and lack of standards that were given
by the ordinance.' Again, this case represented another example
where theCourt showed itself inclined not so much to duck, but to
avoid altogether grappling with First Amendment issues, unless
absolutely necessary to the resolution of the case.
The up~gming theme for. the Court this coming term is one of
"you can run but you cannot hide," because there is a number of
First Amendment cases that are both quite provocative and
pertinent to First Amendment law. There are two cases in
particular that underscore this theme.
The first case, entitled The Board of Regents at the University of
Wisconsin v. Southworth,"' will confront with the issue of
mandatory student activities fees, an issue that has been around for
twenty years. In this case, Wisconsin required all the University
students to pay one hundred sixty five dollars per year for student
activities fees and then allocated the fees to a number of student
groups, which I think it fairly can be called political, or other
groups that espouse viewpoints that some students may not have
agreed with.' The disagreeing students filed suit, taking the
position that the University was forcing individuals, by utilizing
student activities fees, to subsidize the messages of other student
groups, regardless of whether the individual supports the group's
message." Hence, they alleged that this procedure constitutes a
violation of the right not to be compelled to support speech of
which one disapproves.'24
"9 Id. (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), which held that
teenage dancing did not involve the right to associate under the First
Amendment and therefore could be banned).
20 City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 1852.
121 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 1332 (1999).
122 Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 719 (1998).
' Id, at 718.
124 Id. at 735. Specifically, the students alleged violations of First Amendment
rights offends speech and association, as well as rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and reviews other state laws. Id. at 18.
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Previously, the Court has upheld this right in the context of
union members and government employees.'2- The question now
is whether the Court will uphold the right in the context of
university students? This issue is obviously an important one for
both university administrators and college administrators.
The supporters of the student activity fees advanced arguments
based upon a 1995 case where the Court held that there was no
violation of the Establishment Clause where a university used
funds to subsidize student groups.' 6 The University used the funds
for various organizations, including religious student groups. "7
Aligning this case with the present one, the supporters here too
argue that, just because university funds are being used to
subsidize speech does not mean that such speech constitutes the
university's speech. Furthermore, this use of funds does not mean
that the people disagreeing with such speech are having their rights
violated. It will be interesting to see how the Court will resolve the
case. 1
The second case, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, -
deals with today's C-SPAN debate on campaign finance reform."
In this case, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a State of Missouri
statewide campaign contribution limit of one thousand dollars that
Missouri had imposed about five years ago, prior to which there
were no contribution limits in Missouri. m  The Eighth Circuit
stated that before there can be an imposition of contribution limits,
which restrict the candidate's speech, there must be a
demonstration that there is a problem with large contributions in
the state. 32 Moreover, a one thousand-dollar limit on contributions
"25See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association., 500 U.S. 507 (1991).126 See Rosenburg v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819 (1995).
127  d. at 822.
128 The Court agreed that the use of student fees to fund a wide variety of
special educational activities does not violate the First Amendment. See Board
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 120 S. Ct.
1346 (2000).
'
29 No. 98-963,2000 WL 48424 (U.S. Jan 24, 2000).
130 1d at *1.
131 Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 523 (8th Cir.
1998).
132 161 F.3d at 521-22.
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does not buy much anymore in terms of speech or influence. '
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit struck down the thousand-dollar limit
on campaign contributions, as it failed the strict scrutiny test."'
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and consequently
heard argument one week ago. In any event, by the end of the
term, we will know whether the theme of "unlimited spending but
limited giving" will continue, or whether the Court will use that
case as a way of revisiting the original Buckley case by saying that
if speqding limits are bad, then giving limits are no better.3
Another case worth mentioning is called Los Angeles Police
Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corporation.'36 This
is a very important commercial speech case. The case involves a
restriction on the police department preventing it from
communicating the names of arrestees to the public.3 7 However,
there is an exemption, as the names can be reported to certain
members of the public for educational and other similar
purposes.' 8
However, as the casino advertising case stated, "one cannot have
a scheme riddled with exceptions." 39 Is the Los Angeles Police
Department riddled with exception? The Court will have to tell us.
This case will also provide an occasion to decide the issue of
whether using information for political or educational purposes
affords one greater protection, while using it only for commercial
purposes mailing to arrestees to sell them a new lawyer is subject
to lessor scrutiny. Moreover, the issue that the Court refused to
deal with in the casino advertising case-- whether to abandon the
four-part test and adopt a higher standard of scrutiny for
commercial speech -- will be addressed in the Los Angeles Police
Department.40
133 id.
'34 Id. at 522-23.
'
35 The Court upheld the Buckley approach, i.e. spending limits are bad, giving
limits are good. See, Nixon, 120 S. Ct at 897.
136 120 S. Ct. 483 (1999).
137 Id. at 486-87.
'
31ld. at 486.
139 See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1923
140 Here, too, the Court finally rejected a First Amendment claim, ruling that
the government had simply denied access to this information, a less direct free
speech problem. See Los Angeles Police Department, 119 S. Ct. at 489.
388 [Vol 16
FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
There are additional cases that deal with nudity and pornography
that are worth mentioning. One case that deals with the issue of
whether communities can ban live nude dancing implicates the
1991 Supreme Court case entitled Barnes v. Glen Theater."' In
this case, the Court held that communities could ban live nude
dancing in bars and other places, but the decision was three to two
to three to one.' Since this decision, there has been a great deal of
personnel change within the Court, so the Court will revisit the
issue.'43
Finally, there are three other cases that I will briefly note. One
case involves pornography and is entitled United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc.'" The main issue in the case is the
extent to which cable operators offering the Playboy Channel have
to either carry such fare after midnight when there are less children
watching, or completely scramble the signal in order to prevent
"signal bleeding."'45 In this case, the Court will once again revisit
the issues of not only whether in the First Amendment family of
free speech there is greater speech and lesser speech, but also
whether the lesser speech is subject to greater regulation."'
Another case to be resolved, Hill v. Colorado,"7 involves
abortion clinic demonstrations. In the past, the Court has dealt
with this issue on two occasions," with both concerning
injunctions against demonstrations and sidewalk counseling of
people entering or leaving abortion clinics. 49 Now the Court is
141501 U.S. 560 (1991).
142 Id at 580-81.
143 The Court did revisit the issue, and reached the same conclusion that
communities can ban live nude dancing. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., TDBA
"Kandyland," 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000).
'4 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1996), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 2365 (1999).
45 945 F. Supp. at 774. Signal bleeding is a technical term meaning that one
watching a cable television station can see a little and hear a little even if one is
not subscribing. Id
4 Id.
147 973 P.2d 1246 (1999).
141 See Schenck v. Pro Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357
(1997) and Bray v. Alexandra Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
149 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§18-9-122 (West 1999). This statute provides:
(1) The general assembly recognizes that access to health care
facilities for the purpose of obtaining medical counseling and
treatment is imperative for the citizens of this state; that the
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faced with a Colorado statute restricting such activity anywhere
within one hundred feet to the entrance of an abortion clinic. 50
What is new about this case is that it is a statute not an injunction.
One must wait and see whether this will make any difference in the
outcome.
The final case is Mitchell v. Helms."' The issue is whether the
New Orleans School Board, in receiving federal finds for
education, can make those funds available for the purchase of
exercise of a person's right to protest or counsel against certain
medical procedures must be balanced against another person's
right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an
unobstructed manner; and that preventing the willful obstruction
of a person's access to medical counseling and treatment at a
health care facility is a matter of statewide concern. The general
assembly therefore declares that it is appropriate to enact
legislation that prohibits a person from knowingly obstructing
another person's entry to or exit from a health care facility.
(2) A person commits a class 3 misdemeanor if such person
knowingly obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another
person's entry to or exit from a health care facility.
(3) No person shall knowingly approach another person within
eight feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for
the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to,
or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such
other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of
one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility.
Any person who violates this subsection (3) commits a class 3
misdemeanor.
(4) For the purposes of this section, "health care facility" means
any entity that is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or
permitted by law to administer medical treatment in this state.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a
statutory or home rule city or county or city and county from
adopting a law for the control of access to health care facilities
that is no less restrictive than the provisions of this section.
(6) In addition to, and not in lieu of, the penalties set forth in this
section, a person who violates the provisions of this section shall
be subject to civil liability, as provided in section 13-21-106.7,
C.R.S.
Id.
150 Fd.
"'1 51 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 2336 (1999).
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computers and other educational resources to private schools,
including religious parochial schools.'52
For a long time in the church and state debate, the Court has
basically stated that government can provide certain benefits and
facilities to all schools, including religious schools, but cannot
provide instructional materials." The Mitchell case involves
computers, which of course can be used for secular research and
education and learning, but can also be used for sectarian research,
education and learning." The challengers in the case claim that
this provision violates church and state separation because the
government is funding the computers.'
The Supreme Court will ultimately have to decide the issue, but
lurking behind this issue is the biggest issue of all: vouchers. This
issue is one of the biggest political issues to confront the Court.
Moreover, depending upon how the Court decides Mitchell v.
Helms, the voucher issue may become one of the biggest
constitutional issues ever: namely, whether the government can
give vouchers for educating children and whether those vouchers
can be used in public schools, private schools or parochial schools.
It certainly will be an interesting Term. Thank you very much.
152 Id at 356.
1,5 3 Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2003 (1997).
5 Id.
155 Id.
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